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SECTION I
SAFETY CRITERIA
A. SCOPE
This publication describes methodology for determining potential
safety hazards involved in the co6struction and operation of
photovoltaic power systems and provides guidelines for the
implementation of safety considerations in the specification, design
and operation of photovoltaic systems.
B. PURPOSE
This document will aid in the establishment of safety
verification procedures for use in solar photovoltaic systems. _
I_ Reference documents
"gerformance Assurance Procedures Handbook, System Safety,"
Office of Fossil Energy Programs, DOE, (draft) March 1979.
- "Safety Procedures for the 25 kW Solar Photovolta_c Array at
Mead, Nebraska," MIT/LL, April 1978.
- "Solar Photovoltaic Seminar, Part III, Special Safety
Considerations," PRC Energy Analysis Co., (draft) June 1979.
C. SAFETY PROGRAM
The contractor is responsible for establishing a safety program
in conformance with all applicable regulations, codes, standards and
specifications. This program should be designed to use any existing
effective procedures and practices which satisfy these guidelines.
However, the specific methods of uncovering potential safety hazards
mentioned herein-must be considered and the generation of Hazards
Analyses, Failure Mode and Effects Analyses, and Safety Audits are
responsibilities of the @ontractor. The methods of performing these
HA, FMEA and SA functions described in this document, however, are
advisory, and equivalent methods _re acceptable.
D. SAFETY PROGRAM PLAN
I. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
The contractor shall perform a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
on the initial system design. This analysis will allow-considerat_on
of safety hazards both in the designed configuration and in perceived
failure mode configurations. An example of an FMEA system is given in
Appendix A. The FMEA will be updated and presented at the Critical
Design Review.
i-I
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2. Hazards Analysis
The contractor shall perform a preliminary Hazards Analysis
early in the conceptual phase of the project so that safety
considerations are included in tradeoff studies design alternative
decisions. Subsystem and system Hazards Analyses shall be performed
to identify hazards within the functions of the subsystems and the
system as a whole. The effects on safety engendered by the failure
modes determined by the FMEA shall be identified. An example of a
Hazards Analysis is given in Appendix B.
3. Safety Audit
The contractor shall perform a System Safety Audit on the
preliminary design. This audit will include both design configuration
and system failure mode configurations as determined by the FMEA. The
Safety Audit will be updated at the Critical Design Review and a final
Safety Audit will be accomplished as a part of the final system
Readiness Review. An example of a Safety Audit is given in Appendix C.
4. Safety Manuals and Admonitions
The contractor shall prepare safety manuals and admonitions as
required to ensure safety in the construction and operation of the
facility.
5. Safety Considerations in Design
The design of the facility will be accomplished with system
safety in mind. The output of the FMEA, Hazards Analyses and Safety
Audits will be fed back into the design process to minimize the
hazards disclosed by the audits.
E. CRITERIA
The requirement for the contractor to perform a Hazards
Analysis, FMEA, and Safety Audit on new contracts will normally be an
inherent part of the contractor's System Safety Program Plan, provided
in response to photovoltalcs contract requirements.
Existing contracts may be modified to require submittal of a
Systems Safety Program Plan incorporating the requirement to provide a
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis, a Hazards Analysis, and a Safety
Audit at the discretion of the DOE project manager. This decision
will be influenced by the slze_ complexity, and amount of work
remaining on the project being considered and also by the benefit that
will be obtained.
F. SAFETY DATA
Lists of the actual and potential safety hazards uncovered
during the design and operation of a solar photovoltaic project shall
be submitted to the DOE Photovoltaics Lead Center. This information
is to be incorporated in a reference document for use as an aid in the
safety evaluation of future projects. An example of such a list is
given in Appendix D.
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APPENDIXA
FAILUREMODEANDEFFECTSANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
1. General
This "Procedure for Performing Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
(FMEA)" is provided by DOE's Photovoltaics T&A Lead Center as a guide
to aid contractors in performing the FMEAs that may be required by DOE
photovoltaics contracts, and as an informative document for field
center project managers. It is not intended to impose this document
as a contract requirement, but rather to provide a systematic and
uniform method to perform an FMEA.
The purpose of an FMEA, as addressed, is to provide an orderly,
critical examination of potential failure modes of plants and
equipment, and the causes of the failure modes, in order to assess the
safety of various systems or components, to analyze the effect of each
failure mode on system operation, and to identify the corrective
action, i.e., design modifications. To be effective, the FMEA
reporting must be thorough and accurate, and produce results that can
be easily interpreted by management, engineering and technical
personnel. This procedure defines the overall concept of an FMEA;
what an FMEA is; and when an FMEA is required; it then provides a
method for the performance, evaluation, and documentation of an FMEA.
B. APPLICATION
The objective of the Tests and Applications (T&A) subprogram is
to obtain operational experience with complete photovoltaic systems in
a range of applications. The main thrust of the T&A subprogram will
be directed toward a carefully selected series of experiments in
remote, residential, intermediate load center, and central station
applications. In the latter three experimental areas, interaction
with electric utility generatlon-transmission-distribution grids will
be emphasized. The _mplementation of safety criteria is required in
the planning and conduct of these experiments.
I. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
FMEA, as considered in this procedure, is an orderly analytical
procedure that will aid in the identification of potential weaknesses
and hazards, and focus on the need for engineers to design effective,
reliable and safe plants or equipment by:
- Identification of potential failures and failure modes
- Assessment of the probability of a failure occurring
/
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- Classification of the severity of the failure on the system
Identification of any critical items whose failure
significantly affects the ability of the system to perform
its overall function or significantly affects life cycle
costs or safety
- Assistance in defining corrective action
In the FMEA, each component of a system, subsystem, or equipment
is subjected to a series of "what if?" questions. The analyst answers
these questions by indicating the effect of each failure occurrence
mode on system operation and suggests possible techniques for
minimizing or eliminating these effects. When the probability of each
component failure is estimated, the probability of equipment,
subsystem, or system failure can be estimated and the effect of the
failure described.
2. When an FMEA Should be Performed
An FMEA provides major input to the design reviews that are
conducted periodically throughout the development and construction
phases of a project. Because limited design information is available
during the conceptual design, an FMEA may be performed at the initial
functional level of the equipment or system. As more engineering
design information becomes available and as the design progresses, an
FMEA can be performed in successively greater detail on lower
functional levels. The FMEA can be performed at any time on a new
project or existing plant or equipment.
The level to which an FMEA is performed is a function of:
- The detail of information available
- The development or construction phase of the plant or
equipment
- The end effect of a failure
- Where the item of interest is located in the functional
breakdown structure
- The level to which the design requires verification
3. FMEA Objectives
As a result of an FMEA, failure modes of an operating plant or
equipment can be identified, evaluated, and presented in an orderly
and organized manner. The analysis aids in verifying the integrity of
the design and in identifying design features that minimize or obviate
the effects of potential failure modes. Nazards to life, plant, or
V
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equipment operational success can be identified and assessed for
individual failure modes. Hazardous failure modes (those with both a
high probability of occurrence and a major severity to plant
operation) can then be addressed for immediate corrective action.
More realistic engineering estimates (reliability, safety,
performance, etc.,) can be made. For example_ by knowing the manner
in which a failure occurs, engineers can achieve high reliability by
considering redundancy at the component or part levels. Redundancy at
these levels is not normally considered when estimates and assessments
are based on the stress levels only.
4. FMEA Output
The final results of an FMEA are a criticality value for each
failure mode at any functional level and a recommendation for
corrective action. When the failure mode criticality is known and the
need for corrective action verified, management decisions for design
review or engineering redesign can be implemented.
In addition, the FMEA information will assist in:
- Establishing realistic guidelines for a program to test
and demonstrate "availability factors"
Establishing criteria to validate availability factors when
other data are not available, e.g., failure rates
Evaluating plant or equipment availability, cost
effectiveness, and operational costs
Establishing data collection guidelines to validate plant or
equipment functional characteristics, e.g., reliability,
performance, safety
Identifying high component or part stress levels requiring
corrective action, e.g., use of more reliable components,
reduction of applied stress, or use of redundant components
or parts
C. DETAILED PROCEDURE FOR PERFORMING AN FMEA
I. Procedure
A step-by-step procedure for performing an FMEA is presented in
this section.
STEP I: Determine the Functional Level Breakdown Structure
(FLBS)
A Functional Level Breakdown Structure (FLBS) is usually
depicted as a functionally-oriented family tree composed of
subdivisions of a plant, system, or equipment. The first step in its
development is to determine the functional level breakdown of the
A-3
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largest item, i.e., a plant or major equipment. The plant or
equipment is then subdivided into its various systems, then further
divided into equipment, assemblies, subassemblies, and parts. The
FLBS provides a ready reference to the functional relationships of
each item comprising the total plant or system. Figure A-I
illustrates a typical FLBS.
Information used to develop the FLBS is gathered from the
engineering data package, engineering design concepts, system
functional descriptions, engineering designs, and process
descriptions, etc.
The number of successive functional levels identified in an FLBS
is a matter of judgment. For example, it should not be necessary to
break down an off-the-shelf9 co_ercially available item being used in
an assembly.
STEP 2 : Identify and Number the Elements of the Functional
Level Breakdown Structure (FLBS)
To facilitate the identification of item functions throughout
the FMEA and to ensure traceability to all data elements, a consistent
and logical coding system is required. The numbering system should
uniquely identify the item and reflect its association with items at
higher and lower levels.
Described below is a recommended coding system that may be used
in performing an FMEA. The decimal-based coding system described
provides traceability from the highest to the lowest level in the FLBS.
Each block of the FLBS is assigned a number which is placed in
the lower right-hand corner of the block. In this manner, any level
can be readily associated with its higher or lower level item and any
failure mode can easily be traced within the hardware system structure.
Figure A-I illustrates the use of this coding system.
LEVEL O" Project name_ e.g., Photovoltaics Test and
Applications Experiments
LEVEL i: A system, plant, or overall function, e.g.,
Stand-Alone Photovoltaic Power Plant
LEVEL 3:
LEVEL 4:
Equipment_ e.g., Solar Array
Major assemblies, e.g., Solar Sub-array
LEVEL 5: A subassembly of the assembly, Level 4, e.g.,
Solar Module
LEVEL 6: Parts within a subassembly_ Level 5, e.g._ Solar
Cell
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STEP 3: Develop a Functional Block Diagram (FBD)
The Functional Block Diagram (FBD) is developed from the
Functional Level Breakdown Structure. It graphically presents the
interfaces among the individual elements of the function being
studied. All inputs to and outputs from each element are indicated on
the diagram and clearly labeled. Information required to develop the
FBD is obtained from the engineering data package. (A block diagram
will be developed for each item at levels involved in FMEA). Figure
A-2 is an example of an FBD.
The following guide is suggested:
- Define the item function(s) and each element therein
- Ensure that the operation of each element is known
- Illustrate relative position of each element with a block
and connect these to illustrate functional relationships
- Identify each block by name and number in accordance with
Step 2
- Enter operating and input/output parameters for each
element and for the item
- Ensure that the FBD illustrates the functional relationship
between each element
The FBD provides a readily verifiable reference list of the
functions and specified output of the elements. It can be used in
subsequent analysis to:
- Identify inadequate or missing input/output specification
requirements
- Identify failure modes
- Derive accurate failure effects definitions
- Verify compliance with specification requirements
STEP 4: Identify and Collect Information Required
In order to fully evaluate the functions, failures, and effects
of the system as a whole, and its component elements as developed in
the FBD, considerable information may be required. This information
can be obtained from the engineering data package, manufacturer's
catalogs, functional diagrams, engineering drawings, failure reports,
environmental descriptions, etc.
V
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Some of the specific elements of information that may be
required by the engineer or analyst in completing the FMEA are:
- Generic Name - Common name of the item being analyzed, e.g.,
power conditioning unit
Physical Location - Place where the item resides in the
facility, such as a building name or number; if a location
number is available, include that number
- Manufacturer's Name - Name of the item manufacturer and his
item name if that is different from the generic name, e.g.,
Sunverter
- Model Number - The model number assigned to the item by the
manufacturer
- Assembly Drawing Number - From the engineering data package9
the engineering assembly drawing number that includes the item
- F/N and Drawin_ Number - The "find" number used on the
assembly drawing for the item being analyzed
Operating Parameters - Conditions under which the item
operates in the system; all items that do not apply should
be marked as not applicable (N/A)
Manufacturer's Specifications - The manufacturer's
recommended operating conditions, not to be confused with
design operating conditions
- Operating Life Expectancy - Estimation of the item's life
in the system
- Maintenance Schedule - The frequency of schedule maintenance
for the item
- Power Source - The type of energy used to power the item,
e.g., electricity, fuel oil, gasoline, solar flux
Controls - The equipment that is used to maintain the function
within proper operating limits, e.g., motor controllers,
voltage regulators
- Switch/Instrument Locations - The location of switches and
instruments that monitor and control the item
Intended Function and Operation - A description of the item,
including: the manner in which the item functions within the
system; how parts within the item interface with the item; and
how the item relates to the system
v
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- Critical Parts - The name of each part that may cause an end
item failure or system hazard
- Probable Failure Modes - A description of how each part may
fail
- Probable Cause - The probable reason for failure, e.g., poor
lubrication, operator error, insulation breakdown, corrosion
- Effect on Item - Conditions that occur in the item when the
part fails, e.g., overheating, fire, electric shock
- Interfacing Item - An identification of interfacing components
or systems that may be affected by a failure of this item
- Interface Effect - Description of the effect that a failure of
this item will have on an interfacing system
STEP 5: Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Worksheet
To facilitate systematic performance of an FMEA and to record
the analysis, a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Worksheet has been
designed and is shown in Figure A-3. Instructions for the completion
of the worksheet can be used as a guide to the performance of FMEA.
For ease of reference, lines and columns of the worksheet shown in
Figure A-3 have been numbered.
ao Identification Data
i) Project/Facility - Identify the project facility
2) Level - Enter initial level FLBS number and item name
3) Drawing Number - Insert drawing number of the item
4) Level - Enter next lower level FLBS number and item name
5) Drawing Number - Insert drawing number for lower level item
6) Level - Enter next lower level FLBS number and item name on
which the FMEA is being performed, such as: 3 battery bank
7) Drawing Number - Enter drawing number for lower level item
8) Company - Insert name of company conducting the FMEA
9) FMEA Engineer/Analyst - Insert name of the engineer or
analyst performing the FMEA
i0) Date - Enter date on which FMEA was performed
ll) Reviewed by - Insert the name and title of the person
within the company who reviews the FMEA
A-9
a25o-3
b. Analysis
12) Item Number - Insert FLBS number of item being analyzed
13) Item Name/Function - Insert the name and function
postulated to fail
14) F/N (Find Number) - Insert "find" number for item
obtained from assembly drawing
15) Operating Parameters - Enter a brief description of the
item's parameters obtained from the Item Functional
Narrative Description
c. Identification and Traceability. A sequence number is
assigned for each failure mode of an item and recorded in the S/N
column (Column 16) of the FMEA Worksheet. To maintain complete
visibility of each failure mode and its relationship to the system_
the failure mode sequence number should be placed in parentheses when
associated with an item function number, and shown as:
2.2.1 (2)
This indicates the second failure mode associated with the Level 3
item.
d. Failure Modes. A failure mode of an individual item is
postulated on the basis of the stated requirements contained in the
equipment specifications and engineering judgment. A "realistically
probable" failure mode is one that can cause a deviation from
specified output function requirements.
Each output function is evaluated in terms of one or more of
these modes I each realistic and probable mode is described concisely
in Column 17 - Failure Mode.
e. Probability of Occurrence. Obtaining this value of
probability of occurrence of a specific failure mode can be quite
difficult, particularly in the earlier phases of project development.
However, some measure (or estimate, or even "gut feeling") of this
probability is needed to evaluate failure modes. One approach is to
use ordinal rankings of the likelihood of occurrence; this naturally
leads to the categorizing of like failure probability into groups.
Differing analyses have used differing schemes of grouping. One
method uses six levels of probability of occurrence ranging from
"frequent" to "impossible." However, it might be noted that once a
failure mode is adjudged impossible, it needs no further consideration
and can be excluded from the analysis. Whatever scheme of probability
assessment is used in the FMEA will depend upon the availability of
failure occurrence data and specifics of the ranking system used.
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f. Failure Symptoms and Methods of Detection. For each
failure mode, the analyst determines how a failure will manifest
itself, e.g., a change in the recognized functional behavior pattern.
Symptoms may be confined to the operation of the specific item under
consideration (local) or to be both "local" and "end effect" evidence
of failure.
g. Method of Detection. The method of failure detection
should be stated. Detection is made possible by features incorporated
in the design to monitor and recognize that a failure has occurred or
will occur. The early detection of failure is of critical importance
if successful operation and output of an equipment or potential
personnel hazards are involved. It is of minor importance if impact
provisions may be incorporated in the design to detect specific
failures before they constitute hazards. Such monitoring devices may
be included in various levels related to the criticality of the
function.
h. Failure Reasons. The possible reasons for each postulated
failure mode will be identified, described, and listed with the
symptoms in Column 19. A failure mode can have more than one cause,
so all possible independent causes within the next lower levels are to
be considered. For example, failure causes at Level 3 are considered
when performing a Level 2 analysis. Failure cause identification is
an iterative process. When adequate failure cause identification and
description cannot be established at the next lower level, the
analysis should be continued to a lower level until satisfactory
identification and description of failure cause can be determined.
Lower level analysis is generally possible as a project progresses
through the development and construction phases and more design
engineering information becomes available.
STEP 6: Failure Effects
A failure effect is the consequence of each failure mode on an
item's operation, function, or status. These effects are identified
and recorded in Column 20 on the FMEA Worksheet. The failure effect
also impacts on the next higher level, and ultimately may affect the
Initial Level under analysis. Therefore, both a local effect and an
end effect as well as compensating provisions should be defined and
evaluated.
Local Effects - The consequences of each postulated
failure on the output of the item, including second-order
effects. The purpose of defining the local effects is to
provide a basis for judgment when evaluating existing
compensating provisions or formulating reco_nended
corrective action. In some cases, there may be only local
effects.
A-12
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End Effects - The effects of the postulated failure on the
operation, function, or status of the next higher level.
These should be assessed concurrently with local effects.
The end effect described may be the result of two failures
-- for example, the failure of a safety device to function
at the same time that item function exceeds design
limits. End effects resulting from a double failure
should be evaluated and defined on the FMEA Worksheet in
the remarks column (Column 29).
Compensating Provisions - Any internal compensating
factors that circumvent or mitigate the effect of the
postulated failure. Identification and evaluation of
these provisions are necessary to evaluate the true
behavior of the item in the presence of an internal
failure. Compensating provisions include redundant items
that provide continued and safe operation if one or more
items fail; alternate modes of operation; safety or relief
devices; and any other means, such as monitoring or alarm
provisions, that ensure effective operation or reduce
damage when failures occur.
STEP 7: Severity of Failure
The severity of each failure must be assigned by the
analyst. The criteria used to evaluate severity will differ according
to the specific aims of the analysis. For example, a failure that is
of high severity to a reliability analyst may be negligible from a
safety point of view. In some cases, actual numerical values of the
loss can be used as the failure severity, e.g., the value of the
product not produced, the cost of repair, etc. However, most
frequently, losses are grouped into categories. In most analyses
dealing with safety, four levels of severity are used, but the analyst
should choose the system of assessing severity most appropriate to his
aims and the specifics of the system being studied. As an
illustration, the definitions of the categories of severity of loss
for systems safety analyses are given:
Category IV - Negligible: Failure will not result in
personnel injury or damage to the system or environment.
Category III - Marginal: Failure can be corrected or
controlled without injury to personnel or major damage to
the system or the environment.
Category II - Critical: Failure will cause personnel
injury or major damage to the system or the environment,
or will require immediate corrective action for personnel
or system survival.
Category I - Catastrophic: Failure will cause death or
severe injury to personnel, system loss, or major
environmental damage.
i,i
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Analogs of the severity categories for system availability,
maintainability, etc._ can be constructed. The number of categories
used depends largely on the amount of information available about the
system.
The derived value of severity assigned is the higher level that
can be applied to a failure, even if a lower classification is also
applicable. This category is entered for each failure reason on the
FMEA Worksheet in Column 21.
STEP 8 : Criticality Assessment
The assets available to implement corrective actions are limited
in any project. Therefore_ an effort must be made to prioritize the
failures to be corrected. An acceptable ranking measure would be the
expected loss due to each failure mode. This i8 the product of the
probability of occurrence of the failure mode and the loss resulting
from it_ where the loss might be measured in dollars. Then the
failure mode with the highest expected loss would receive the rank of
highest criticality, and have the highest priority for corrective
action. However_ the analyst does not usually have actual values for
either the loss or the probability of occurrence_ but only ordinal
ranklngs or classifications, which cannot be so easily combined.
Defining criticality as the product of the ranklngs of probability of
occurrence and severity is a mathematically spurious use of rank order
statistics that can lead to mis-prioritizing failure modes_ and
consequent misuse of corrective action assets.
Schemes do exit for prlorltizing failure modes based on ordinal
rankings and most rely on the construction of a criticality matrix.
An example of a criticality matrix is shown in Figure A-4. In this
example_ four categories of probability of failure and four categories
of severity are used. The failure mode identification number is
entered in the appropriate box of the matrix and the criticality of
all failure modes can be visualized. This matrix can show dominant
failure modes (high probability and severe effect)_ but rankings modes
that are not dominant requires study of the specifics of the failure9
both its likelihood and its consequences. Ultimately, engineering
judgment must be used to assess the priority of criticality of each
failure mode.
Criticality has different effects on various plant or equipment
levels. For example, an item may fail in a particular mode;
criticality to the item amy be major (the item ceases to function).
However, loss of the item may have little or no effect on the
subsystem or system. Hence_ criticality at the higher level is minor
or insignificant. The analyst must, therefore_ assess the effect of
failure on the item as well as on other levels of the system. The
assessed criticality values for item, subsystem, system9 and
interfacing systems are documented on the FMEA Worksheet (Columns 24,
26, and 28).
I
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High
Low
2.2.1 (4)
2.2.1 (2)
2.2.3 (3)
2.2.2 (i)
2.2.3 (2)
2.2.1 (5)
2.2.2 (3)
2.2.1 (1)
2.2.1 (3)
2.2.3 (1)
2.2.1 (4)
2.2.3 (4)
2.2.2 (4)
4 3 2
Category of Severity
High
Probability of Failure Occurrence
i - High
2 - Moderate
3 - Low
4 - Unlikely
CAtegory of Severity of Failure
i - Catastrophic
2 - Critical
3 - Major
4 - Minor
_J
Figure A-4. Illustration of Criticality Matrix.
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STEP 9 : End Effects and Criticality
When the failure effects of the item have been analyzed and
entered in Column 20_ the category of Severity of Failure assessed and
entered in Column 21, and the criticality assessed and entered in
Column 22_ the analysis of failure effects is complete. The end
effect on the subsystem is concisely described in Column 23_ and its
criticality value entered in Column 24.
The end effect on the system is described in Column 259 and
criticality shown in Column 26.
Interfacing systems affected by the failure should be identified
by the FLBS number and entered in Column 279 along with a description
of the effect. Criticality should also be computed and entered in
Column 28.
STEP i0: Remarks
The analyst is expected to recommend corrective action based on
his analysis of failure modes effects and criticality. These
recommendations should be noted in Column 29 to clarify any point of
the analysis.
STEP II_ Prepare Problem/Failure Report (P/FR)
The final step in the FMEA is to document the corrective actions
recommended and provide a mechanism for management follow-up to ensure
that they are implemented. The Problem/Failure Report provides such a
mechanism.
The purpose of the Problem/Failure Report is to:
- Summarize identified failure modes
Identify the failure mode location through the FLBS number
Summarize effects of failure on item, subsystem_ system_
and interfacing systems
Tabulate and rank failure modes according to criticality
value
Identify and document recommended corrective actions
- Document actions taken to implement corrective action
Periodically document the status of implementation of
actions by P/FR status reports.
Project management should require periodic updates of P/FR
Status Reports on the progress of corrective actions. These reports
should be closed out.
V
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STEP 12: Prepare the FMEA Report
After an FMEA has been completed, it is essential that a
technical report be prepared to document the detailed data, analysis,
findings, and status of recommended corrective actions. This report
should be distributed to appropriate management and engineering
personnel within the company and to other personnel involved with
project design review.
D. SUMMARY
This procedure has established the steps necessary to perform a
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) on an item at any level.
Specifically, this procedure:
Provides a technique for performing a thorough analysis
that can identify engineering and technical problem areas
and failure modes at specific plant levels, and contribute
to the validity of the design review process
Provides an analytical technique that can identify
necessary corrective action, and presents the information
so that top management can make management and technical
decisions which, when implemented, can improve the safety
of plants and equipments, can reduce or eliminate plant
and personnel hazards_ improve efficiency and
effectiveness, and reduce life-cycle costs.
A-17
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DEFINITIONS V
The following definitions are pertinent to a Failure Mode and
Effects Analysis:
Critical Item - An item which, if it fails, will cause the
shutdown of an entire system or plant, or pose a threat to
life
Criticality - Estimated measure of the failure mode impact
on an item; it is derived by considering the possibility
of occurrence of a failure mode with its severity
Criticality Matrix - A method used to combine the
probability of failure occurrence with the category of
severity to provide a relative value for criticality
End Effect - The impact of a failure mode on the
operation, function, or status of the next higher-level
item, e.g., the failure of an equipment or subsystem
Equipment - Two or more functional assemblies operating
cooperatively to produce a functional objective or output
Failure - Non-performance of a specified function
Failure Cause - A defined condition associated with a
failure
Failure Effect - The resultant condition of a failure on
an item's function, operation, or status. Failure effects
may be classified as local effect or end effect
Failure Mode - The manner in which a failure occurs.
Failure modes can be classified in one of four ways:
- Premature operation of an item
- Failure of an item to operate at a prescribed time
- Failure of an item to cease functioning at a prescribed
time
- Failure of an item to function at a specified level
during operation
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Worksheet - A form for
consolidating an item's function, level, failure symptoms,
failure mode, effect, severity, and criticality. It is
the basis for identifying corrective action and making
recommendations for using the FMEA output
I-
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Functional Block Diagram - A graphic representation of how
the individual elements of a function relate; all inputs
to and outputs from each element are identified
Functional Level Breakdown Structure - A functional
diagram composed of subdivisions of a system plant, or
equipment; it depicts in successive levels the
relationship of individual assemblies, equipment, and
their component parts
Initial Level - The highest level upon which the FMEA is
to be performed
Interface - The relationship of an item's functional
output to the input of an associated item
Item - An item may be a system, subsystem, equipment,
component, or part
Item Narrative Functional Description Form - A form for a
narrative description of an item's physical and
operational characteristics
Level(s) - The relative complexity of a plant, system,
assembly, or function. The levels progress from the
complex (project) to successively lower breakouts of items
Local Effect - The impact of a failure mode on the item
being analyzed
Operating Parameters - The normal and acceptable range of
the physical and operational characteristics within which
an item functions (not the manufacturer's specification
limits)
Severity - A qualitative measure assigned to each failure
effect based on its impact on the operational functioning
of the item
Subsystem - A subsystem is composed of two or more
equipments operating cooperatively to achieve a functional
objective or output
System - A system is composed of two or more functional
subsystems operating in a cooperative manner to achieve a
functional objective or output
A-19
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APPENDIX B
PROCEDURE FOR PERFORMING A HAZARDS ANALYSIS
v
A. INTRODUCTION
i. General
This "Procedure for Performing a Hazards Analysis" is provided
by the DOE Photovoltalc Lead Center as a guide to aid contractors in
performing a Hazards Analysis and as an informative document for the
field center project managers. It is not intended to impose this
document as a contractual requirement, but rather to illustrate a
systematic method for performing a Hazards Analysis in order to assure
safety in the design and deployment of systems and equipments.
The scope of Systems Safety excludes industrial safety, which is
concerned with the job-site safety of personnel and the compliance of
work areas with federal, state and local code.
Hazards Analysis, as addressed in this procedure, is a major
element of a total System Safety program, and complements procedures
for Failure Mode and Effects Analyses and other System Safety
activities. This procedure defines the overall concept of Hazards
Analysis_ i.e., what is a Hazards Analysis? When is a Hazards
Analysis required? It provides a recommended methodology for Hazards
Analysis, and the reporting of results to management for necessary
actions.
B. APPLICATION
I. Scope
The objective of the Test and Applications (T&A) subprogram is
to obtain operational experience with complete photovoltalc systems in
a range of applications. The main thrust of the T&A subprogram will
be directed toward a carefully selected series of experiments in
remote, residential, intermediate load center, and central station
applications. In the latter three experimental areas_ interaction
with electric utility generation-transmission-distrlbutlon grids will
be emphasized. Inherent in all photovoltalc T&A projects is the need
to ensure that safety is designed into the system. As part of a
methodical approach to system safety engineering, hazards associated
with each system, subsystem, equipment, and component must be
identified, evaluated, and either eliminated or controlled to an
acceptable level. The timely detection of these hazards is
cost-effective not only from the standpoint of design and development
but also on a llfe-cycle basis. System hazard points must be
described and documented.
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2. Hazards Analysis Defined ....
Hazards analysis as considered in this procedure is a systematic
process for examining the functional interrelationships of a system to
establish the following:
Identify hazards, determine corrective actions 9 and
establish corrective action priorities
Assess the injury or damage that is associated with each
hazard and the probability that it will occur
Determine which hazards can be prevented either through
modification of a design or by changing procedures
associated with its use
Determine methods to control those hazards which cannot be
eliminated from the system by changes in design or
procedure
Assess the risk associated with operating or using the
system after it has been determined that hazards be
eliminated or controlled
Determine those hazards for which it is desirable to
establish and monitor an alarm system
- Determine and assess those hazards, e.g.:
- Excessive noise levels
- Inadvertent release of kinetic energy
- Inadvertent release of potential energy
- Exposure to excessive heat or cold
3. When is a Hazards Analysis Required?
Hazards analyses are performed at appropriate phases of system
development to ensure that hazards are recognized and controlled, that
hazards have not been overlooked, and that new hazards are not created.
a. Conceptual Design - A preliminary hazards analysis is
performed early in the conceptual phase of the project so that safety
considerations are included in tradeoff studies and design
alternatives. Based on the best available data, hazardous conditions
associated with proposed design or function are evaluated for hazards
probability, hazard severity, risk, and probable operational
constraints. Safety provisions needed to eliminate or control hazards
are identified and used in preparing performance and design
specifications. This preliminary hazards analysis establishes the
framework for further hazards analyses and for safety engineering
evaluation of system design.
V
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5. Preliminary and Detail Design - During these phases, the
design of system components progressively becomes more specific.
Based on the preliminary hazards analysis, the engineer can establish
both generic and specific safety criteria to aid the design effort
(e.g., "all pressure vessels shall have a vent or bleed valve."). The
preliminary hazards analysis then is replaced by final hazards
analyses performed at increasing levels of design detail and design
maturity. The results of these analyses are major inputs to the
in-house design process documented through these expanded efforts.
c. Subsystem Hazards Analysis - A subsystem hazards analysis
is performed to identify hazards within the level of the subsystem and
within the function of the subsystem. This analysis identifies all
components and equipments whose performance, performance degradation,
functional failure, or inadvertent operation could result in a
hazard. It includes a determination of the failure modes and the
effect on safety when failures occur in subsystem components. The
subsystem hazards analysis should begin as soon as actual design of
the subsystem has been developed and continue as more detailed design
information becomes available.
d. System Hazards Analysis - A system hazards analysis is
performed on subsystem interfaces to identify hazards above the
subsystem level and within the functions of the total system. It
examines the effect of subsystem hazards on the whole system. Such
analyses should also begin with design and include a review of
subsystem interrelationships for:
- Compliance with safety criteria
Possible, independent, dependent, and simultaneous failure
that presents a hazardous condition, including failure of
safety devices
Degradation from normal operation of the safety of a
subsystem or the total system
Changes that occur within subsystems, so that the system
hazards analysis can be updated accordingly
e. Construction_ Operation_ and Maintenance - Operating and
support hazards analyses are conducted prior to, and during, the
operation and maintenance phase. They are oriented to development and
operational testing to identify hazards and determine safety
requirements for personnel, procedures, and equipment during these
phases. Engineering data, developed from the engineering design and
initial test programs, and preliminary hazards analyses are used to
support these analyses. Results provide the basis for:
Identifying hazardous time periods for equipment
operation, and the actions required to minimize risk
during this time
B-3
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Identifying requirements for safety devices and equipment 9
as well as the monitoring procedures needed to detect
functional failure
Developing warnings, cautions, and enhancing the safety of
procedures used in operation and maintenance
Developing special procedures for handling, storage_
transportation_ and maintenance
Establishing requirements for contingency plans and
procedures
C. CRITERIA
The requirement for the contractor to perform a Hazards Analysis
on new contracts will normall# be an inherent part of the contractor's
System Safety Program Plan provided in response to Photovoltaic T&A
contractual requirements.
Existing contracts may be modified to require submittal of a
System Safety Program Plan incorporating the requirement to provide a
Hazards Analysis at the discretion of the DOE program manager. This
decision will be influenced by the size, complexity, and amount of
work remaining on the project under consideration and also by the
benefit that will be obtained.
D. PROCEDURE - PERFORMING THE HAZARDS ANALYSIS
This section provides a step-by-step procedure for conducting a
hazards analysis, using a hazards analysis worksheet (Figure B-l), for
performing and documenting the analysis. The following describes the
worksheet and discusses pertinent input data, analysis techniques,
hazards identification and descriptions, severity and probability, and
corrective action measures. For convenience, pertinent lines and
columns on the form in Figure B-I have been coded and each will be
discussed.
I. Input Data
Hazards Analysis data is obtained from analysis of available
design data and experiences. These data include:
- Mishap and accident reports
- Mishap probabilities from safety reports
System safety analyses
Failure mode and effects analyses
Fault tree analysis
V
V
B-4
b250-3
¢,J •
7_
N
u
, , , o
_ i _ i_
• .':7. '7
gl
w,,il
l :
ml_l&l
...i;
<I I
-_ICM
t
--t !
t
t_
1
I
r
I
i
tl
i
I
'' i
It,
I
t
t
I
'II
I
I
t ii
tlil
ii
ii
i
t_
• ,M
0
m
_p
I
W
)
B-5 ORIGINAL PAGE IS
07 POO'_. _.!AUTY
5250-3
- Failure probabilities from reliability analyses
Test results from test programs
- Human-factors data from human factors studies
- Functional breakdown structures from project management
plans
- Item functional narrative descriptions from energy
management plans
- Problem/failure reports from reliability analyses
Figure B-2 illustrates the numerous sources of data used in performing
hazards analysis.
2. Identification and Administrative Data
Lines I through 17 on the worksheet identify the item being
analyzed, provide a means of relating it to other items, and provide
references:
Line I - Insert the name of the item (system) subsystem)
equipment, etc.) on which the analysis is performed.
Line 2 - Insert project name or facility.
Lines 3_ 5_ and 7 - Insert the functional breakdown structure
identification of the item. The development and codification of
a functional breakdown structure has been described in the
procedure for performing a failure mode and effects analysis.
Lines 4_ 6 t and 8 - Insert drawing or specification numbers
associated with the item.
Line 9 - Insert page number.
Line I0 - Insert 0 for the initial hazards analysis. The
letters A) B) C) D) etc.) are used to designate subsequent
analyses.
Line Ii - When a prior analysis is revised) insert the date of
the revision.
Line 12 - Insert name of company or government agency performing
the analysis.
Line 13 - Insert the name of the individual responsible for
conducting the analysis.
Line 14 - Insert the date of the initial hazards analysis,
v
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Logistics Support Plans
Maintenance energy analysis, Life-
cycle cost, integrated logistics
Industrial Standards
Underwriters evaluations; NFDA:
ASME standards; ANSI
Gov't. Standards & Regulations
OSHA, HEW, DOD, DOE
Environmental Protection Stand-
ards & Regulations
Industrial Plant Safety Standards
Protective clothing, omergency
pro=edures
Reliability Programs
Failure mode & effects analyses;
Fault tree analyses_ sneak anal.
Human Factor Programs
Operahfng constraints; man-machlne
interface
Operation Procedures
Contlngen_y analysis
k
w
DD-
J
I
i
v
v
v
v
r
v
System Effectiveness
and
_Trade-off Studies
Hazards Analysis I
I
Safety Statements
Figure B-2. Some Data Sources Used in Conducting a Hazards Analysis.
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Line 15 - Insert the name of the individual reviewing or
approving the analysis.
Line 16 - Insert type of analysis, e.g., preliminary hazards
analysis; subsystem hazards analysis; system hazards analysis;
or operating and support hazards analysis.
,
Line 17 - Insert project development phase, e.g., concept,
design, development, construction, demonstration, or operation.
The development phase of the project relates to the type of
hazards analysis (Line 18) and the revision number (Line 12).
Analysis Techniques
The selection of a specific method of analysis is based upon the
level of complexity of the plant, system, or equipment under
consideration, the level of the item within the functional breakdown
structure (FBS), and the status of system development. The technique
selected must allow for continuity through the system llfe-cycle. It
should also permit coordination of analysis results to ensure that
hazards are removed or minimized.
Hazards analyses may be either qualitative or quantitative.
Models and techniques should be compatible with those being used by
other disciplines, e.g., reliability, human factors. Analysis
techniques may be inductive or deductive. For example:
7
- An inductive method such as fault hazard analysis can be a
qualitative or quantitative analysis. It requires
investigation of the subsystem to determine hazard modes,
causes, and effects. A failure mode and effects analysis
provides most of this information.
A deductive method such as fault tree analysis is used to
analyze all events, faults, and occurrences and their
combinations that could cause or contribute to the
occurrence of a defined undesired event. A qualitative or
quantitative analysis may be conducted. A logic diagram
(fault tree) is used to analyze undesired events. This
analysis identifies all events and combinations of events
that can result in the specific undesired event.
Mathematical techniques have been developed for combining
and simplifying probabilities and quantitative evaluation.
4. Hazard Identification
Hazards analysis is undertaken to identify hazards and either
eliminate the cause or minimize the effect. Depending on when the
analysis is performed, it should identify and assess:
Hazardous components (e.g., energy sources, fuels, battery
acids, high voltage, and pressure systems).
B-8
vSafety-related interface considerations among various
elements of the system (e.g., material compatibilitles,
inadvertent activation, fire/explosion initiation and
propagation, degradation in the safety of a subsystem or
the total system from normal operation of another
subsystem).
Environmental considerations, including the normal
operating environment (e.g., drop, shock, extreme
temperatures, noise and health hazards, fire,
electrostatic discharge, lightning, radiation).
Operating, demonstration, maintenance and emergency
procedures (e.g., human error analysis of operator
functions, tasks, and requirements; effect of
environmental factors such as equipment layout and
lighting on human performance; llfe support requirements
and their safety implications, crash safety, egress,
rescue, survival, and salvage).
Facilities, support equipment, and training (e.g.,
provisions for storage, assembly, checkout, proof-testing
of hazardous systems/assemblies which may include toxic,
flan_nable, explosive, corrosive or cryogenic fluids;
electrical power sources; training and certification
pertaining to safe operation and maintenance).
Safety-related equipment and safeguards, and possible
alternative approaches (e.g., interlocks, system
redundancy, fail/safe design consideration, subsystem
protection, fire suppression systems, and personal
protective equipment).
Hazardous time periods and the actions needed to minimize
risk during this time.
The need for design changes to eliminate or control
hazards.
Requirements for safety devices and equipment and
maintenance procedures needed to detect their functional
failure.
The need for warnings, cautions, and special emergency
procedures for operating and maintenance.
The need for special procedures for handling, storage,
transportation, maintenance, and modification.
Compliance with safety criteria.
_p\
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5. Describing the Hazard
Analysts identify system hazards by responding to "what if?"
questions geared to the system. Responses isolate hazardous
conditions, their causes and effects, and determine the state of the
system when hazards would occur. To assist in the analysis, a list of
"standard" types of hazards within the particular project should be
developed. This list, modified as required, plus a list of generic
hazards, e.g., explosion, toxic vapor release, etc., should provide
sufficient descriptive terminology. Identified hazards and related
findings are entered in Columns 18-22 on the worksheet shown in Figure
B-I.
Column 18 - This is a number assigned to a hazard within
the functional level being analyzed. When added at the
end of the functional breakdown structure identifier
developed during a failure mode and effects analysis, it
uniquely identifies a hazard.
Column 19 - Enter a brief description of the hazard
developed from the analysis.
Column 20 - Insert the "state" or condition of the item
when the hazard exists. Typical states would include
test, standby/waiting, operation, maintenance, etc.
Hazards can exist in one or more states with the
probability of occurrence changing as the state changes.
For example, in a test state where normal operating
standards may be far exceeded and protective devices not
operating, the probability and severity of an accident are
far greater than normal; in normal operation, protective
devices, pressure controls, or operating conditions would
reduce the probability of occurrence and could reduce
severity as well.
Column 21 - Insert the fundamental cause of the hazard or
the events which lead to the hazard. General descriptions
such as mechanical failure, or radiation are acceptable in
initial hazard analyses. However, action needed to
prevent the hazard requires a precise detail for action to
be taken. For example, the cause of a pressure vessel
rupture might be overpressurization, wall corrosion and
deterioration, or metal fatigue.
Column 22 - Insert the effect of the hazard on personnel
or system safety. This can be determined from failure
mode and effects analyses, fault tree analyses, and system
functional specifications or other analyses. There are a
number of ways a hazard can affect a system. It can:
force a contingency mode of operation which may or
may not degrade system operation
B-IO
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force an abort of system operation
require an abort that is precluded because no total
system loss or fatal injury occurs. The system may
still partially function but in a degraded mode or
reduced capacity.
6. Hazard Severity
Hazard severity, qualitative measure of a hazard's impact on the
system and the personnel involved, is entered in Column 23. Severity
values are based on the following categories:
Category I - Catastrophic. May cause death or system loss.
Category II - Critical. May cause severe injury, severe illness,
or major system damage.
Category III - Marginal. May cause minor injury, minor illness,
or minor system damage.
Category IV - Negligible. Will not result in injury, illness,
or system damage.
Hazard severity categories may require adaptation to the
particular program under review and may include definite transition
points between categories. More specific definition of the degree of
injury or damage may also be required.
These categories are particularly useful in evaluating the
results of the preliminary hazards analysis. They establish a
priority for minimizing or eliminating hazards during the design phase
and provide data needed for the more detailed subsystem and system
hazards analyses.
7. Hazard Probability
The probability that a hazard will result in an accident during
the life of the equipment may be described as "potential occurrence
per unit of time, events, populations, items or activities."
Assigning a quantitative hazard probability to a potential design or
procedural hazard is generally not possible early in the design
process; a qualitative hazard probability may be derived from analysis
and/or evaluation of system safety data obtained from a similar plant,
system, or equipment. Supporting data for assignment of hazard
probability is listed in hazards analysis reports. Qualitative hazard
probability ranklngs are assigned as follows and entered in Column 24.
\ z
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DESCRIPTIVE WORD VALUE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL ITEM FREQUENCY
Frequent 1
Probable 2
Likely to occur frequently
Will occur several times in life
of an item
Occasional 3 Likely to occur sometime in life
of an item
Remote 4 Unlikely that this hazard will be
experienced
Improbable 5 Probability of occurrence is
almost nil
NOTE: Hazard severity and probability of occurrence are combined
in the Hazards Analysis Report to form an "initial risk
assesment" value. This value establishes priorities for
corrective action and resolution of identified hazards
(D.9.b Item 4).
8. Corrective Action
Corrective actions to eliminate or minimize hazards revealed by
analyses should be developed and entered in Column 25. If
catastrophic and critical hazards cannot be eliminated or controlled
at an acceptable level, alternative measures should be developed
immediately. The following order of precedence for corrective actions
is suggested.
Design to eliminate hazards. If an identified hazard
cannot be eliminated, control it through selection of
design alternatives.
Control hazards at acceptable levels. Hazards which
cannot be eliminated through design selection must be
controlled through use of fixed, automatic, or other
protective safety features or devices. Periodic
assessment of safety devices will be made.
Detect and warn. When neither design nor safety devices
can effectively eliminate or control an identified hazard,
special devices to detect the hazard and generate an
adequate warning signal should be installed. Warning
signals should be designed to elicit appropriate reactions
among personnel and should be standardized within like
types of system.
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Develop procedures and training. Where it is impossible
to eliminate or adequately control a hazard through design
selection or use of safety and warning devices, safety
procedures and training should be used to control the
hazard. Procedures should include the use of personal
protective equipment. Certification of personnel
proficiency in performing safety critical tasks and
activities may also be necessary.
Column 25 - Describe the recommended corrective action.
Corrective action will vary according to such factors as
severity of injury or damage, the probability of
occurrence, and the effort (including cost) required to
take preventive action. The action recommended can vary
from modification of a maintenance or operating procedure
to extensive modification or redesign of the system.
Column 26 and 2 - Enter the category of severity and
probability of occurrence assessed on the basis of the
corrective action described in (27). For example, an eye
hazard because of machine operation (metal chips) was
initially classified as a critical category (II) of
severity, with a probability of occurrence of (I); While
the hazard may not be eliminated, it is reduced by use of
protective eye shielding; the corrective action is to wear
an eye shield at all times. As a result of the corrective
action, the hazard is reclassified as a category (IV) and
the probabability of occurrence, (4)_ remote.
9. Hazard Analysis Reporting
A Hazard Analysis Summary/Status Report should be prepared
periodically to summarize for management the results of the analysis,
corrective action taken or recommended, and the status of ongoing
corrective action.
The hazards analysis worksheet provides information for the
report that will be used by design engineers and management in
assessing system safety.
a.
I)
Purpose of the Report
Summarize identified hazards
2) Rank the hazards by risk values
3) Identify and record recommended corrective actions to
eliminate (or reduce) the hazards
4) Document steps taken to implement corrective action
5) Provide status of corrective actions
B-13
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b. Prepar_n_ the Report. The Hazards Analysis Summary/Status
Report_ Figure B-3_ should be completed according to the following
guidelines.
I)
2)
Insert the name of the item_ subsystem or system which has
been analyzed.
Enter a sequence number for the hazard, e.g.y number ly 2,
3, 4, etc. Hazards should be listed according to their
risk value. For example, high-risk hazards (values 1-3)
would be listed first with others listed in descending
order of risk value.
3) Enter the identified hazard. The hazard listed is
obtained from the hazards analysis worksheet (21), and
each hazard on the worksheet must be listed in the Hazards
Analysis Summary/Status Report. The hazards will not be
in the same order as on the worksheet since they must be
listed in descending order by risk value. It is not
necessary to write as detailed a description as on the
worksheet; a brief identification of the hazard is
sufficient.
4) Insert the initial risk assessment value obtained by
multiplying the category of severity by the probability
value in columns (25) and (26) of the worksheet. This
value provides a relatively simple way of ranking hazards
for management action. These values can be categorized as:
Category Risk Value Assessment
High 1-3 Requires urgent attention. Hazard
is likely to occur and can result
in loss of llfe and/or system.
Moderate 4-8 Requires attention. Hazard can
reasonably be expected to occur
with injury and/or major system
damage. Costs of injury and system
downtime will exceed acceptable
standards.
Low 9-12 If hazard occurs it may cause minor
injury or system damage. Costs of
injury and system downtime are at
or below maximum acceptable
standards.
Insignificant 13-20 Little chance of hazard occurring.
If it does there will be minimal
impact on system or personnel.
Corrective action recommended only
if time and funds are available.
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Figure B-4. Hazards Analysis Flow Diagram
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5)
6)
7)
Describe recommended corrective action. This description,
although brief, should coincide with the corrective action
recommended on the hazards analysis worksheet, Column 27.
Describe the status of corrective action. The description
should be sufficiently detailed so that a risk assessment
value can be set.
Enter a final risk assessment value based on the status of
the corrective action. The final risk value should be
higher than the initial risk value if the hazard has truly
been eliminated or reduced to an acceptable level and
system safety obtained.
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DEFINITIONS
The following definitions are pertinent to a Hazards Analysis:
Accident - Any unplanned/undesired event that results in
personal injury, death, and/or property damage or
equipment loss.
Failure Effect - The impact of a failure mode on the
operation, function, or status of higher-level items
(e.g., the failure of an equipment on a subsystem, or upon
successively higher levels). The impact may have a "local
effect," involving only the failed item, or an "end
effect" involving an element of the system or its
environment.
Equipment - Two or more functional assemblies operating
cooperatively to produce a functional output.
Failure - Mal-performance of, or inability to perform, a
specified function.
Failure Cause - A defined condition that results in a
failure.
Failure Mode - The manner in which a failure occurs, e.g.,
"valve fails to open," "loss of power," "short circult_"
or "open circuit."
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis - A technique for
evaluating and documenting the manner in which components
or systems fail and determining the impact of the failures.
Fault Tree - A logic diagram that graphically displays all
the potential events and event interactions that can lead
to an undesired event.
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) - An analysis of an undesired
event, by means of a fault tree, to determine the
likeliest sequence of events leading to the undesired
event, and to develop controls to prevent the undesired
event.
Functional Level Breakdown Structure - A structure diagram
composed of functional subdivisions of a system, plant, or
equipment; it depicts in successive levels the
relationship of individual assemblies, equipment, and
their component parts.
Hazard - Any actual or potential condition that can result
in, or contribute to, an accident (e.g., the presence of
fuel in an undesired location is a hazard; the fuel iteslf
is not).
V
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Hazard Severity - A qualitative assessment of the worst
potential consequence of a hazard. Severity is defined by
the degree of injury, illness, property damage, or
equipment damage that would result from an accident caused
by the hazard.
Level(s) - The physical and/or functional level of
organization of elements in a plant, system, assembly, or
function. The levels range from more complex to simpler
divisions, i.e., system, subsystem, equipment, component,
or part.
Safety - Freedom from unacceptable risks to persons,
property, or the environment, or the capability for
dealing with all such risks.
System - A system consists of functional elements (e.g.,
personnel, procedures, and physical resources) integrated
in a cooperative manner to perform its intended
function(s).
Subsystem - A subsystem is an element of a system which
performs a function to support a system.
System Safety Engineerin_ - An element of system
engineering which applies specialized professional
knowledge, skills, and techniques to identify, eliminate,
or control systems hazards.
Undesired event - A significant event that is detrimental
to system operation such as an accident, a potential
accident, a power outage, etc.
B-19
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APPENDIX C
PROCEDURE FOR PREPARING A SYSTEM SAFETY AUDIT
A. INTRODUCTION
This procedure for preparing a System Safety Audit Procedure is
provided by the DOE Photovoltaics Tests and Applications (T&A) Lead
Center as a guide to aid contractors in preparing a System Safety
Audit Procedure as required by DOE contracts and as an informative
document for the field center project managers. It is not the intent
to impose this document as a contract requirement or to replace or
radically alter the contractor's existing audit procedures that are
being successfully implemented on Photovoltalcs T&A programs. This
procedure simply provides a systematic approach for the contractor to
use in preparing or modifying his existing system safety audit
procedure so that when implemented along with other performance
assurance plans and procedures it will strengthen and improve the
Photovoltaics Program.
This procedure defines typical requirements and provides
examples of documentation required in a system safety audit as it
progresses through the stages of familiarization, on-site examination,
evaluation, and reporting on the operation of a system.
This procedure will enable the contractor to prepare his system
safety audit procedure by describing how he will meet the appropriate
requirement of the typical audit plan and also the requirements of his
system safety program plan.
B. APPLICATION
The objective of the T&A subprogram is to obtain operational
experience with complete photovoltaic systems in a range of
applications. The main thrust of the T&A subprogram will be directed
toward a carefully selected series of experiments in remote,
residential, intermediate load center, and central station
applications. In the latter three experimental areas, interaction
with electric utility generation-transmlssion-dlstributlon grids will
be emphasized. Inherent in all photovoltaics T&A projects is the need
to ensure that safety is designed into the system. As part of a
methodical approach to system safety engineering, audits should be
conducted to verify that system safety has been adequately addressed
during project design and development. These audits should assess
areas such as system safety activities, operating procedures,
maintenance quality, training, and when necessary, system safety
enforcement. The audit enables the field center project managers,
along with contractors and other project personnel, to determine the
effectiveness of any safety features incorporated in the plants,
systems or equipment, and also through the audit report provides the
basis for followup to ensure necessary corrective action.
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C. CRITERIA
The requirement for the contractor to perform system safety
audits will normally be incorporated in all approved contractor system
safety program plans as part of the photovoltalcs T&A contract
requirements. Existing contracts for photovoltaics projects may be
modified to require submittal of a system safety program plan
incorporating audit requirements. Such a decision will be at the
discretion of the field center project manager and will be influences
by the amount of work remaining on the project being considered and
also by the benefit that will be obtained.
D. PROCEDURE FOR PREPARING SYSTEM SAFETY AUDIT PROCEDURE
i. General
This procedure describes'the approach the contractor may take in
preparing his system safety audit procedure for any photovoltaics T&A
program. The procedure consists of two basic steps:
a. Review the specifications contained in the contract and also
the contractor System Safety Program Plan and determine what he, as
the contractor, will do to meet these requirements.
b. Using the typical audit procedure requirements (paragraph 4,
below) as a guide9 prepare an audit procedure including the
requirements from step a., above.
2. System Safety Program Plan Requirements
The contractor should review his approved System Safety Program
Plan which describes "what" he will do to meet the contractual
requirements and to satisfy his basic obligation to provide an
economical and effective safety plan that will meet the needs of the
project. The contractor should now determine "how" he will implement
a system safety audit that will meet the requirement of his Systems
Safety Plan.
3. System Safety Audit Procedure
Paragraph 4 provides the typical requirements for a
Photovoltaics Program safety audit. The contractor should review
these requirements and in conjunction with the requirements
established in the previous paragraph 9 provide an audit procedure that
describes "how" he will meet these requirements. The contractor
should be aware that the typical requirements in paragraph 4 are
provided only as a guide and it is still the contractor's
responsibility to provide an audit procedure that meets all contract
and project requirements.
V
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4. Typical Requirements - System Safety Audit
a. Responsibility. The overall responsibility for the system
safety audits should be established for each type of audit, i.e.,
Preliminary Audit - An audit conducted after design and
layout concept are completed and technical feasibility of
the project is established, but before commercial-type
components are combined into a small model pilot plant.
Special Audit - An audit conducted if test programs or
engineering studies indicate that a major design
modification requires further evaluation, if a system
safety problem cannot be resolved or corrected, or as
otherwise directed or specifically indicated.
Major Audit - An audit normally conducted after completion
of subsystem testing, but prior to the startup of a
demonstration plant.
This assignment of responsbility is especially important since
the contractor may be assigned a supporting role in certain audits;
for example, a special audit initiated by the field center project
manager or a major audit initiated outside of the project. In
addition, the person or organization responsible for initiating
appropriate corrective action after each audit must be clearly defined.
b. Audit Team - The method for selecting the audit team,
notification of team members, technical expertise required, the number
of team members, designation of a team leader or audit chairman, and
distribution of audit reports should be described. The audit team may
be composed of englneers/process designers, and technical specialists
with diverse experience in materials engineering, production or
fabrication, reliability, quality, etc., or the audit may be performed
by a single auditor. See Figure C-I for participation request form.
c. Schedule - A master schedule is usually required for all
audits. This schedule should be updated periodically to reflect major
project milestones, design reviews, etc., and should include type of
audit, i.e. 9 preliminary, special or major, the location of audit, and
date. Normally, a major audit will be scheduled at least once before
commercialization while the frequency of the other audits will vary
with project complexity, criticality, etc.
d. Audit Preparation
i) System Safety Audit Agenda. An audit agenda should be
prepared which describes the type, project phase, and the scope of the
audit to be conducted. It should also list the areas of technical
specialization required for the audit. The form shown in Figure C-2
may be used for all audits to delineate audit team membership by areas
of specialization.
C-3
5250-3 Uc , 5-
_J
(date)
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
XXXX
Subj ec t : REQUEST TO PARTICIPATE AS A MEMBER OF A
SYSTEM SAFETY AUDIT
TEAM
Reference: Project:
Dear xxxx,
In recognition of your technical abilities and experience in
(specialty) , you are invited to participate as a member
of the System Safety Audit Team that will conduct a System Safety Audit
of the above reference project on or about (date)
at (location) A familiarization meeting will be
held on (date) at (time) in room
(number)
I
The attached documents contain an outline of the agenda for the
familiarization meeting (prior to the on-site visit) and indicates your
primary area of expertise and responsibility. Your comments, however,
are welcome in any areas of the systen under review for which you feel
qualified to provide safety information. You can most effectively assist
in the conduct of the System Safety Audit by adhering to the following
precepts:
a. Review System Safety Procedure No.
System Safety Audit.
: Establishing a
b. Study the attached inventory documents before arriving at the
familiarization meeting. The inventory provides you with the information
needed to discuss the safety aspects of the plan/system/equipment.
c. Notify the audit chairman
or his designated representative immediately if, during
your review of the inventory, you discover major discrepancies or over-
sights. Your prompt action can save the time of all team members during
the on-site audit.
Figure C-I. Sample Audit Team Participation Request.
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SYSTEM SAFETY AUDIT (SSA)
Proiect
Aud it No.
Contract No.
Audit Date
t Plant/System/Equipment I Location
TYPE OF AUDIT AUDIT SCOPE OR PROJECT PHASE LEVEL
['-] Preliminary F'I Exploratory Research E_ System
I-"1 Special F--1 Subsystem Development ['-3 Subsystem
["-1 Major F'7 Pilot Plant 1-7 Equipment
CONDUCTED BY [] Appl icat ions Experiment r-] Component
[-'] Structural [] Plant
[] Project Management
[] QA, RA, Safety
[] [-7 Electrical
[] Chemical
["1 All Factors
[] Equipment
SYSTEM SAFETY AUDIT TEMPI (SSAT) MEMBERSHIP
Area _f
Responsibilit>, (l)
SSA Chairman
Pr_,iect Hanager
,_llt t ' ] ,,4 Eng inver
Qual Assurance
Proct, ss Perform, into
Name
Org.
Code
Area of
Responsibility (2)
Human Fac tore
Fabrlcat ion
Thermal
Welding
Environmental
Name
Org.
Code
[:OTI_I_Itrots Maintainabil[tv
Qual it>,
Test/Demonstrat ion
Subcont r;lc t
Support
b[:l irlt enance
1 I
NO it'S :
ORIGINAL PAGE I$
OF POOR QU_!.JTY
(1) Rec,_mm_,nd,.d for ,_lI .qS,\
(2) _;hould be included in SS.\ :is ,q_pli,.lhle. partL'ularlv in a major SSA
Figure C-2. Sample System Safety Audit Agenda.
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2) System Safet_ Audit File. An audit file composed of
necessary reference material and other documents to be used by the
audit team should be established and maintained. A typical file could
include:
- System safety audit agenda
- Requirements for performance, reliability, quality,
safety, etc., that are specified in the contract or letter
- System design (including justification and alternate
designs)
- System engineering (input-output data)
- Complete technical description, specifications, drawings,
and diagrams
- Part and component lists and appllcat[on information
(applied stresses, etc.)
- Project schedule, including milestones
- Operational, maintenance, and test plans
- Test data, analyses, (tolerance, stability, etc.) and
technical information (manuals, reports, etc.)
- Data on process development unit, pilot or demonstration
plants, systems, or equipment (including photographs of
existing systems, subsystems)
- Know design deficiencies and other problem areas
- Changes to correct deficiencies
- Description of operator's duties
- Startup and shutdown (including emergency) procedures
- Physical and operational environments
- Storage transportation plans and requirements
- Training programs for operational and maintenance personnel
- Previous safety hazard analysis and failure mode and
effects analysis
C-6
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3) System Safety Audit Inventory. The audit team members
should be provided a four-part audit inventory which includes
technical documents, specifications, safety requirements, and other
pertinent information. This audit inventory should be assembled and
distributed in sufficient time to permit adequate documentation review
prior to the familiarization meeting. The four-part inventory
consists of:
Part I. Configuration Documentation - A listing of all
pertinent descriptive material that is contained in
the audit file
Part II. Design Requirements - a) A quantitative description
of each environmental and functional design
requirements, b) a performance estimation based on
reasonable engineering judgments, and c) an
identification of possible problem areas
Part III. Process Description - A detailed physical,
functional, and fabrication description of the
system design and safety, plus a summary of energy
requirements and losses
Part IV. Evaluation - A discussion of performance versus
safety requirements
See Figure C-3 for a sample inventory format.
e. Familiarization Meeting. A familiarization meeting should
be planned and convened to acquaint team members with the project to
be audited and to intltlate documentation required for the audit.
Typical activities include technical presentation of:
- Project design (including concept considerations)
Orientation to other units of the system
Approaches to design and performance problems
Other aspects of the project needed by the audit team to
perform a valid audit
Discussion of the supporting systems or equipment
characteristics, for example, safety reliability, quality,
materials
Discussion and documentation of probable safety
deficiencies for each category of the presentation and the
audit inventory
- Review and summarization of the recommendations
C-7
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SYSTEM SAFEIW AUDIT INVENTORY
PART I
CONFIGURATION DOCUMENTATION
Audit No
Project
Plat/Sys/Equip
Contract No
Page No
Subject: CONFIGURATION DOCb$1ENTATION WHICH DEFINES AND SUPPORTS THE DESIGN
Supply the identification and dates of the applicable
documents listed below, and list additional documents
as required. Indicate hy an asterisk (*) those items
which have a direct bearing on the System Safety Audit
(SgA) and attach copies to this inventory if not read-
ily available to the System Safety Audit Team (SSAT)
members.
SPECIFICATIONS, REQUIREMENTS, DESIGN OBJECTIVES
Contractor's Spec
Functional Reqmnts
Plant/Equip Reqmnts
System Design Obj
Item Design Obj
Support Design Obj
Power Subsystem Design Obj.
Human Factor Reqmnts
Plant/Equlp Spec
Fabrication Spec
Test Spec
Subsystem Test Spec
Equip Test Spec
Subassembly Test Spec
Env. Test Spec
Master Index/List
Drawing List
Assembly Diag
Subassembly Diag
Materials List
Schematic Diag
DESIGN DRAWINGS, DIAGRAMS, DATA
Power Diag
Elect/Pwr Load Data
Block Diag
Functional Diag
ANALYSIS DOCUMENTS
Per formance
Tolerance/Error
Reliability/Stress
Structure
Effectiveness
Capacity_
For additional information contact
Maintainability
Safety
Hazards
FHEA
Alternate Design
at
Figure C-3. Sample System Safety Audit
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SYSTEM SAFETY AUDIT INArENTORY
PART 2
DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
Subject: DE [GN REQUIREMENTS
Audit No
Project
Plant/Sys/Equip
Contract No
Page No
List quantitative design requirements and the status
of each (F-Firm; T-Tentatlve; U-Unknown) and the extent
to which they have been achieved (i.e., estimated
performance) based upon reasonable engineering judge-
ment. Use item numbers from the list below. Comment
on difficult or unusual problem areas.
ENA'IRON_ENTAL REQUIREMENTS TO BE CONSIDERED INCLUDE:
i. Temperature Range 6. Corrosion Ii.
2. Material Temperature 7. Humidity 12.
3. Vibration 8. 13.
4. Shock 9. 14.
5. Pressure I_. 15.
FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS TO BE CONSIDERED INCLUDE:
16. Plant Input
17. Plant Output
18. Volume
19. Weight
20. Cost
21. Stability
22. Feedback
23. Power Required
24. Efficiency
25. Cooling Limits
26, Life
27. Tolerance Limits
28. Safety Factors
29. Hazards
30. Stress Distribution
31. Parameter Distribution
32. Reliability
33. Quality
34. Maintainability
35. Human Factors
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
_5.
Figure C-3 (Cont i). Sample System Safety Audit Inventory.
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Item
No
Quantitative Requirements
Describe in Detail
F,T,U
Estimated
Performance
Comments,
Problem Areas
_ I
V
Figure C-3 (Cont 2). Sample System Safety Audit Inventory.
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SYSTEM SAFETY AUDIT INVENTORY
PART 3
PROCESS DESCRIPTION
Audit No
Project
Plant/Sys/Equip
Contract No
Page No
Subject: PROCESS DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM DESIGN AND SAFETY
The description of the system ddsign and safety should include the
following (as applicable):
i. APPLICATION/PIIYSICAL DESCRIPTION (Reader Orientation)
State briefly the purpose and output of the project, the relation to
similar projects, location, configuration, physical dimensions, and safety
requirements (if any) imposed upon the project.
2. FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION (Detailed)
Describe the operation of the project in detail, block-by-block, part-
by-part, for all modes of operation in every stage. Include block diagrams,
schematics, sketches, curves, etc. to clarify the description, particularly
inputs and outputs as to force, mass, heat, vibration, power factors, etc.
Describe protection, fail-safe, and system safety features.
3. FABRICATION DESCRIPTION (Detailed)
Describe construction, volumetric efficiency, mounting, installation,
structural soundness, thermal design, material applications, lubrication,
mechanical and electrical clearances and tolerances, fabrication tolerances,
welding quality, wedding materials, etc. Include photographs, drawings and
sketches to clarify the description.
4. ENERGY REQUIREMENTS AND LOSSES (Summary)
Describe, in tabular form, all forms and quantities of energy generated
hy the project, and provided and dissipated by it.
(Begin Description Here)
I. APPI.ICATION/PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Figure C-3 (Cont 3). Sample System Safety Audit Inventory.
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SYSTEM SAFETY AUDIT [,'WENTORY
PART 4
EVALUATION
Audit No
Project
Plant/Sys/Equip
Contract No
Page No
Auditor
k.¢
Subject: EVALUATION OF DESIGN AND SAFER" (Discussion of
Performance versus Safety Requirements)
I. JUSTIFICATION OF DESIGN
Discuss why the project is designed like it is. Include sufficient
calculations and data to permit assessment of the safety features versus the
design. List and discuss any specification incompatibilities.
2. _TERIALS
Discuss all non-standard materials and processes used, provide sources of
supply, status, procurement, and unusual environmental condfLions wh£ch may
be encountered.
3. RELIABILITY
Discuss what factors and features were included to assure failure-free
operation over a specified period of time. State failure-free operating time
estimate and show calculations.
4. TEST PROGRA_IS
Discuss tests which verify safe performance of the project. Describe
environmental test program and any specific facilities required. Describe
start-up and shut-down test programs. Summarize test results to date, partic-
ularly data which indicates safety of the system.
5. FABRICATION CONSIDERATTONS
Identify critical fabrication areas that would cause functional problems
which may result in a hazardous condition and a system safety problem, i.e.,
pressure drops, relief valves, etc. Discuss changes in fabrication which
would improve system safety. Discuss inspection and quality programs and
activities.
6. MAINTENANCE CONSIDERATIONS
Discuss the design from the viewpoints of maintainability, what controls
are used to assure the quality of maintenance, and the resultant safety after
a maintenance action.
V
Figure C-3 (Cont 4). Sample System Safety Audit Inventory.
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SYSTEM SAFETY Ab_IT INVENTORY
PART 4 - continued
EVALUATION
Audit No.
Project
Plant/Sys/Equip
Contract No
Page No
Auditor
v
7. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Discuss the design from tile viewpoint of providing operational safety for
operating personnel, considering operating requirements, constraints, limita-
tions, level of personnel, and simultaneous task requirements.
8. StqqMARY OF OTHER PROBLEMS
Summarize and discuss anticipated problems not adequately discussed else-
where which may involve system safety or create a hazard resulting in unsafe
eperation or maintenance,
(Begin Evaluation Here)
1. ,IUSTIFICATION OF DESIGN
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR _jA,,_rw
Figure C-3 (Cent 5). Sample System Safety Audit Inventory.
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Schedule the on-site verification and final audit report
- Develop the audit checklist
I) System Safety Audit Checklist. To ensure that all
technical areas of photovoltaic systems or equipment are assessed for
safety, an audit checklist should be developed. The checklist divides
the project being audited into functional areas; for example, general
design and fabrication, pressure vessels, switchgear9 etc. Specific
safety parameters are then listed for each of these areas. During the
audit, the team member will examine each assigned area to determine
whether the design is within the safety parameters and check one of
the columns on the checklist: Acceptable, Non-Acceptable, Not
Applicable. (See Figure C-4). The checklist need not be
all-inclusive, but it should provide a guide to assist team members in
reviewing the safety of design, construction, quality, reliability,
maintainability, human factors, etc., of the project being audited.
f.
i)
2)
Verification meetin_
Scheduling. Provisions should be included in the
procedure to ensure that appropriate personnel are
notified for the on-site verification meeting, including
the project manager and contractor personnel.
On-site Verification Meetln_. The audit team should
conduct on-site verification with project and contractor
personnel in either a single meeting or a series of
consecutive meetings. This depends on the complexity of
the project and the type of audit. The agenda should
include the following:
A general discussion on the method of conducting the
audit, the use of audit checklists, and the requirements
for reporting audit findings
- A general site orientation, rules and regulations
- A discussion of the functional areas of the project
- A description of the on-site verification process
- A schedule for completion of on-site verification
- A schedule and place for the evaluation meeting
3) Verification Audit. Each team member should use the audit
checklist previously developed to verify the safety of the
area for which he is resposible, and then provide his
findings and recommendations for corrective action. A
sample recommended form is shown in Figure C-5.
C-14
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SYSTEM SAFETY AUDIT
CH ECKL I ST
Proiect:
P l an t ! Equ i ptat, n t :
;_ Contrdct No. : L_3cation
E
.Ta
Audit No. : Date
GENERAL DESIGN AND FABRICATION (To Be Defined)
< Z Z
v
Figure C-4.
ORIGINAL PAGE i$
OF POOR ,_LtTY
Sample System Safety Audit Checklist.
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SAFETY AL_IT
RECOMMENDATIONS
Audit No
Project
Plant/Sys/Equip
Contract No
Page No
Auditor
TO:
FROM:
Technical Specialty Area Audited:
Safety Audit Chairman
Summarize your comments concerning the safety of the project, and list your
recommendations. Submit this form to the Chairman at the close of the meeting.
This form will become a part of the safety audit report.
NOTE: This is a suggested format, which may require additional space but para-
graph headings and sequence should be retained.
COMMENTS
Summary of observations and findings:
RECOMMENDATIONS
I suggest that the following items be investigated or changed:
Figure C-5. Sample Recommendation for Corrective Action.
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4)
5)
g,
h.
Audit Recording. Upon completion of the audit checklist
and other on-site verification activities, each member of
the audit team prepares a summary of his findings and
makes recommendations in the area of his technical
speciality. Specific recommendations about areas that
should be changed or investigated should be
cross-referenced to the checklist and/or other audit
documents to support the recommdations. These summaries
may then be used to prepare the audit report and
substantiate the audit results.
Verification Closeout. Once the on-site verification is
completed and checklists and recommendations are
submitted_ and before the team departs, a conference
should be held with the appropriate project and contractor
personnel to discuss the findings, recommendations, and
corrective actions.
Debriefing and Evaluation. After on-site verification is
complete, a meeting should be convened to discuss the team
findings and recommendations. The agenda should include:
Discussion of each functional safety area audited
Assembly of the audit report
Review of recommendations
Overall assessment of project safety
Reporting. All information from the familiarization,
verification, and evaluation meetings should be assembled
and summaries prepared for inclusion in the final audit
report. The final audit report can be organized as
follows:
Cover Sheets - Identifies the type of audit (preliminary,
special, major); date of the report; approval
signature(s); name of the project: the offfice or project
publishing the report; signature of the chairman
Executive Summary - Normally no longer than a single sheet
(single spaced)_ that includes the highlights of the total
audit process, including significant findings on safety
and a summary of the recommendations
Introduction - Contains project background information,
previous safety audits and their outcomes, details of
audit meetings, areas on which technical assessments and
audits were conducted (materials, process, reliability,
etc.), and the rationale used in establishing and
conducting the audit. This section also includes
summaries of the project, system_ or equipment design, and
project management highlights
C-17
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Technical Discussion - A description of the audit
activities performed in each technical speciality area,
audit findings, discussion of checklist items deficiencies
observed, and recommendations to be considered
Summary - A technical summary of the safety aspects of the
project, including technical performance, project
management, and all technical characteristics
(reliability_ quality, etc.) relating to system safety
Findings and Recommendations - Comments on all team member
recommendations and required corrective actions addressed
to appropriate photovoltaics field center management
should also be provided. See Figure C-6 for sample
memorandum
i. Verification Followup. Before issuing the final report_
the audit chairman may brief the appropriate field management
personnel on the findings and recomplendations in the report and also
discuss any unresolved safety issues.
I) Project Action Report. A project action report is usually
prepared by the field center project manager, and lists the acceptance
or rejection of the report findings. The report identifies any
corrective actions taken to resolve agreed-upon safety problems, and
justification for rejecting any items. When initialed, the report
becomes part of the final audit report. Followup reports are prepared
periodically with copies sumitted to the audit file. A suggested
report form is shown in Figure C-6.
2) Completed Final Report. Upon completion of the safety
audit, the audit chairman will submit a completed final report to
appropriate photovoltaics field center management personnel. Followup
on incomplete action items and then notification of appropriate
personnel when all system safety action items are completed is
required.
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SAFETY AUDIT
REPORT
To:
From:
SubJ ec t :
, Safety Audit Chairman
Transmittal of Final System Safety Audit Report.
i. A (type) System Safety Audit was conducted on (project)
at (location) The Project Manager is (name) A
pre-verification meeting was held on (date) at (location) ; an on-site
verification meeting was held on (date) at (location) ; and a
post-audit meeting was held on (date) at (location I.
2. Members of the audit team are listed below together with their organization and
area of specialty.
Name Organization Specialty
3. The final report in this audit is forwarded for your review and comment.
4. Should you have any questions regarding this audit or report please call
(phone no.)
5. Should you desire a formal presentation of the results of this audit or do discuss
any of the recommendations, please contact (office) at (phone no. I
co: TD&A PHOTOVOLTAIC LEAD CENTER
FIELD CENTER PROJECT MANAGER
Appropriate DOE management
Appropriate contractor(s)
File
Figure C-6. Sample Findings and Recommendations Memorandum.
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APPENDIX D
SAMPLE SAFETY LIST
_J
.
.
.
4.
.
.
.
1
9.
I0.
II.
12.
13.
Provide black cloth or other suitable material to completely
cover array to prevent power generation when maintenance is
being performed on live electrical parts.
Any modules whose combined voltages exceeds 50 V should be
provided with a disconnecting means to facilitate maintenance
and troubleshooting procedures.
All systems should have lightning protection.
All systems should have a driven ground when system voltage
exceeds 50 V.
All modules should have adequately-sized_ factory-installed
junction boxes as an integral part of the individual module.
Each module junction box should have insulated stand-off
terminal blocks secured firmly to the junction box with metal
screws or bolts.
All module junction boxes should have weathertight covers and
weathertight cable entrances and exits.
Provision for battery disconnecting means is very important.
There should be provision for array disconnecting means,
especially when array and distribution panel are not within
sight of each other.
All loads on system should have adequate disconnecting means and
branch circuit protection.
Adequate ventilation is imperative when large groups of
batteries are in an enclosure.
Face mask, gloves, and acid neutralizing agent should be
provided where groups of batteries are housed to protect
personnel servicing the batteries.
All batteries should have flame arrestors.
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